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Abstract 
One memorable quote from Karl Marx’s conception of religion is, “religion is the opium of the masses.” 
By this, he critiqued religion as an analgesic that dulls the senses, thus inducing a false sense of satisfac-
tion, and preventing the oppressed from revolting against the grubby socio-economic system. As the sigh 
of the oppressed, religion makes them to resign to fate since it only gives an unrealistic eschatological 
hope. Rather than conceive religion from this prismatic way, contemporary events have shown that relig-
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ion has become an amphetamine or a catalyst for revolt, not only at the global but also national level. This 
work argues that religion is used as an amphetamine, an energizing pill, to pursue other goals than reli-
gious as depicted in the activities of Boko Haram sect, which has raised security challenges in contempo-
rary Nigeria. 
Introduction 
If Karl Marx were to be alive today, he might have been forced to change his view about 
religion particularly as it relates to conflict and violence. This is so because recent global events 
have demonstrated and continue to demonstrate that rather than conceive religion as an opium, it 
is really an amphetamine of conflict and violence. Marx had thought that religion muffles the 
mind of people, especially the oppressed, from being active, with particular regard to inciting 
and prosecuting violence that could usher in social change. The dose of eschatological hope, of 
what is theologically referred to as paradisiacal bliss, stimulates obedience to hegemony of the 
bourgeoisie. He therefore concluded that the death of religion would be a positive sign for the 
freedom of the proletariat, however, through violence. 
This work will briefly show that though Marx had his argument about religion generally, 
his generic use of religion cannot be for all time and all religions. Global and national events 
with reference to religion, particularly radical Islam, have continued to deconstruct his thesis. It 
is this latter view that we are committed to arguing in this work in view of how Boko Haram 
Islamic sect in Nigeria is using religion as an amphetamine of violence. 
The Projection of Religion by Karl Marx 
The main thrust of Marx’s philosophy is social change.  But the idea of social change had 
been on for a long time before the sociological postulations about it by Auguste Comte, Herbert 
Spencer, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim and Max Weber. Two Greek thinkers, Permeniedes and 
Heraclitus had conceived a philosophy of change. While the former conceived the world as inde-
structible and a motionless continuum of matter and space thus making change an illusion, the 
latter thought that the world is in a state of flux, and continues to develop and change immi-
nently. It is the latter view that gains more paradigmatic attention in scholarly circles. But the 
place of religion in the context of change has become a contested one. For instance, Comte’s 
theory revolved around the twin pillars of progress and order, and change and stability. This is 
possible, according to him, only if humanity outlives the metaphysical and theological instincts 
and clings to positivism. This has been given a more philosophical extrapolation by such phi-
losophers as David Hume, John S. Mill, Bertrand Russell and A. Y. Ayer, who argued that relig-
ion and its language are meaningless in human society insofar as they cannot be empirically veri-
fied. They propounded scientific empiricism or logical positivism that theoretically ousted relig-
ion from the framework of meaningful discourse or construct.1 Comte criticized religion by say-
ing that it does not give freedom to people. According to him, religion is a collective delusion or 
symbolic thinking that involves incorporeal objects of powers. These do not answer practical or 
existential questions that steer man at the face, but move them aside and offer false hope. It is 
this social dysfunction of religion that makes Comte to describe religion as an expression of im-
mature thought. Religion with its supersensible reference, therefore, is an antithesis of social 
progress.2  
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 Marx’s thesis can be best described as a syncretism of Georg Hegel’s dialectical under-
study of history in which change is conceptualized from the working out of contradictions pre-
sent in situations and Ludwig Feuerbach’s materialism that opposed Hegel’s idealism. Marx 
added English economics and salted it with French socialism. With the collaboration of Friedrich 
Engel’s communist ideology, which virtually criticized capitalism, Marx succeeded in construct-
ing “a heady brew that intoxicated many European intellectuals.”3 
Marx thought that Hegelian materialism was idealist simply because it “knew nothing of 
class struggles based on economic interest, production and all subordinate elements in the indus-
try of civilization.”4 Marx believed that historical materialism must be conceptualized within the 
conflict that arose in the struggle between historically developed classes namely, proletariat and 
bourgeoisie. The conflict between the classes can best be understood from the prism of factors of 
production and mode of exchange. The economic or social structure that derived from this mate-
rialist conception of history can again be appreciated against the backdrop of the lopsided nature 
of the distribution of wealth. Engels argued in this regard that distribution of wealth stems from 
production and exchange of products which in turn form one social basis of social structure. It is 
this that divided every society into classes that depend on “what is produced, how it is produced, 
and how the products are (appropriated and exchanged).”5  
 Ted Peters views this materialist conception of history in the relationship between the 
developed and developing worlds. According to him, the main trust of capitalism is “surplus 
value”, that is, the excess value that results from mass production. The conflict between classes 
in every capitalist society arose as a result of management or administration of this excess value. 
In fact, the industrial revolution Europe, North America and Japan have been in possession of 
global excess value. By this, they were able to assure themselves of constant supply of raw mate-
rials from the developing world and developed “peripheral markets” around it so that the surplus 
value can flow back to them while buying raw materials cheaply.6 Carmody and Carmody rec-
ognized this Marxian material dialectics but the Marx’s prediction that the proletariat or the de-
veloping nations would become so “immiserated”7 as to resort to revolt and form classless soci-
ety or world still begs for fulfillment. More importantly, religion, which Marx saw as a bane to 
the realization of this philosophic vision, is covering much space among the proletariat of the 
developing world. And in many instances, religion, especially in the form of prosperity gospel, is 
empowering the poor to a greater extent. That brand of religion is growing increasingly in the 
global south where concern for the poor is taken as a pious act. And Nigeria is not left out.8 
    However, what is the role of religion in Marxian dialectical theory? Marxian materialist 
ideology conceives of salvation as “the satisfaction of economic needs and triumph of the op-
pressed class over bourgeois exploitation.”9 The greatest sin of humanity, according to this 
thought, is the commission of economic injustice; this is the abandonment of faith. Just as be-
lievers in God conceive Satan as the greatest adversary to their ultimate salvation, Marx argued 
that religion qua religion is the greatest adversary to the economic liberation of the proletariat. 
Marxian dualism is obvious here: God and Satan, rich and poor are in constant struggle. As be-
lievers in human society, a pragmatic approach needed to be instituted to overcome whatever 
opposed humanity’s freedom. Marx identified religion as a clog in the wheel of the desired revo-
lution.  This is so because religion is an illusion; it is a body of myths that tell fairy tales obscur-
ing reality – oppression and exploitation of the proletariat by the bourgeois.  
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 Marx further argued that in order to strengthen the structural dualism, the bourgeois 
evolved the concept of religion. This is borne out of the extraction of the self into some form of 
abstraction. This was borrowed from Ludwig Feuerbach’s atheism that God is man. The imagi-
nary God elsewhere, according to Feuerbach, is illusory and diversionary. Therefore humanity 
must take its destiny in its hand.10 According to Marx, “man makes religion, religion does not 
make man. Religion is indeed the self-consciousness and self awareness of man who either has 
not yet attained to himself or has already lost himself again.”11 In Marx’s thought, religion is an 
integral part of capitalist ideology. As a powerful superstructure, religion creates “an illusory 
value system to keep the poor in their place by teaching them to be submissive, obedient and 
resigned to their lot in life.”12 In other words, religion as a product of the genius of the bourgeois 
encourages them to accept their deprivation, prompts them towards “illusory realization of hu-
man ideals, which provide men with compensation for surrender”13 so that the status quo ante 
could remain. 
‘Religion as an Opium’ 
 The foregoing conception of economic injustice, according to Marx, required violent 
change, which could be championed by the proletariat. But the desired change was impossible 
because religion generally, and theology in particular, that is, the “formal study of God,” the 
“worst enemy of the spirit”14 had become a powerful sedative that makes the proletariat to slum-
ber. As a consequence, they painfully endured their condition. Marx saw religion as capable of 
uniting human beings together but silent on “the historical forces that have separated them”15 ab 
initio. Attempts by religion to forget the antagonistic stage that resulted in alienation of man for 
his labour were also calculated to further immiserate the proletariat.  
 For Marx, religion originated from base aspects of humanity. Its God, if he existed, he 
contended, breeds his kind as demonstrated in the bourgeois, who oppressed the proletariat. This 
conception of reality would mean that the world lacked order and purposiveness. The doctrine 
that this disorder should be allowed to stay unchallenged and proffer unreal hope was the worst 
form of injustice and suffering that religion could inflict on humanity. According to him, “reli-
gious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real suffering and a protest against 
real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and 
the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people.”16 This being so, religion must be 
abolished in order for the world to be purposive. As he put it, “The abolition of religion as the 
illusory happiness of the people is the demand for their real happiness. To call on them to give 
up their illusions about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires illu-
sions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of that vale of tears of 
which religion is the halo.”17  
Marx was not alone in constructing religion as an opiate. In fact, Bertrand Russell gave it 
a philosophical support. According to him, it was the prevailing social conditions that gave birth 
to the concept of religion. When religion became organized, it became dangerous to humanity, 
particularly the less privileged. That is why he described religion as “the principal enemy of 
moral progress in the world,” which is “a disease born of fear and a source of untold misery to 
the human race.”18 A distinct manifestation of this could be seen in the Inquisition. It is a crea-
tive genius of the oppressors. As Niccolo Machiavelli agreed, 
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Our religion has glorified humble and contemplative men rather than men of ac-
tion. It has assigned as man’s highest good, humility, abnegation and contempt for 
mundane things. This pattern of life, therefore, appears to have made the world 
weak and to have handed it over as a prey to the wicked, who run it successfully 
and securely since they are all aware that the generality of men with paradise as 
their goal, consider how best to bear, rather than how best to avenge, their inju-
ries.19  
Lenin also described religion as terror-inspiring social machine at the hands of the op-
pressors to perpetually check the oppressed. Grounded in this thought, like Marx, he argued that 
the eschatological hope that religion promised is a diversionary strategy of the oppressors. This 
is why he reasoned that religion is an escapist device.20 If paradise existed it should exist on earth 
and not in fantasy as religion offered. For preventing the earth-based paradise, religion therefore 
is an opiate, “a spiritual booze, in which the slaves of capitalism drown their human image, their 
demand for a life more or less worthy of men.”21  
Lenin’s efforts to transmute ‘Marxist social construction into a political program’ led to 
the combination of “dialectical theory with revolutionary practice that forged disciplined, ruth-
less central authority to control the proletariat.”22 His sanctioning of violence as the heart of all 
change made Marxist ideas politically effective but also restrained many would-be followers 
because of its “ruthlessness, lack of more scruple, and hatred of religion.”23  
However, Alec R. Vidler argued that despite this highhandedness of Marxism-Leninism 
against religion in Russia, the social laboratory of their ideology, religion still influenced the 
people. According to him, the conception of religion as being a perquisite of the ruling class to 
bridle the oppressed did not completely reflect the true position in Russia. He wrote, 
Whatever justification for this view there may have been in Western Europe, it 
was far from being realistic in Russia where the Orthodox Church was essentially 
a Church of the people and the ruling classes were for the most part alienated 
from it. Whatever measures the communists adopted to extirpate religion would 
not hit the ruling classes but the peasants.24 
The point being emphasized here is that communism became in essence an ideology that 
oppressed the oppressed beyond what Marxism-Leninism accused religion of. If religion as they 
conceived it denied freedom to the oppressed, their alternative, as Vidler argued, did more to 
further deny them freedom to be human. It is indeed religion that provided a bulwark against the 
extremism of Marxism-Leninism. 
Religion as an Amphetamine 
It can be argued that religion as an amphetamine is an antithesis of Marx’s thesis that re-
ligion is the opiate of the people. If Marx conceived religion as opium that makes the masses 
surrender, one would be forced to argue that such philosophy was time and space-bound. It is 
time bound because it seems not to adequately reflect the recent global events which religion is 
championing, especially the extreme form of political Islam. It is space bound because it does 
not enjoy universal appeal. Even where it operated, it has been found that religion rather than be 
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a socio-economic construction of the ruling classes was indeed an energizer of the oppressed 
against the oppressors.  
Marx’s opium theory appeared to be grounded largely against Christianity particularly 
the Catholic Church that was widespread in his time. Some Islamic scholars have argued that 
Marx and Lenin generalized the concept of religions without giving credence to distinctions 
among them. Islam, as will be shown shortly, encourages violence to effect a social change. As 
Marx conceived,  
The social principles of Christianity preach cowardice, self -contempt, abasement, 
submissiveness and humbleness, in short all the qualities of the rabble, and the 
proletariat, which will not permit itself to be treated as rabble, needs its courage, 
its self-confidence, its pride and its sense of independence even more than its 
bread. The social principles of Christianity are sneaking and hypocritical, and the 
proletariat is revolutionary.25  
Andrew N. Wilson apparently trying to buttress Marxist position of the opium theory 
ended up presenting religion as truly an amphetamine. In his caustic criticism against religion, he 
left no one in doubt that God rather than religion is the worst enemy of humanity. Since it has 
been historically proved that religion generates and sanctions wars, strife, tyrannies, oppression, 
suppression of the truth and the like, it stands to reason that its functions are unfavourable to hu-
man peaceful co-existence particularly in an unequal society. Thus, “it might be truer to say that 
the love of God is the root of all evil.”26 Consequently, Marx’s conception of the opium is not 
completely true about the possibilities of religion. In Wilson’s words, “Marx described it as the 
opium of the people; but it is much deadlier than opium. It does not send people to sleep, it ex-
cites them to persecute one another….”27 Marx’s aversion to, and the strong belief that religion 
would die off naturally upon the defeat of capitalism must have blinded him to this truth. 
Samuel Huntington’s controversial article, “The Clash of Civilisations” which was ex-
panded later into a book raised critical issues that pushed public debate on the pertinence of re-
ligion in political economy or foreign policy. According to him, “the fault lines between civiliza-
tions will be the battle line of the future.” Rather than being driven by ideological prowess and 
economic puissance that determined the prosecution of the Cold War, Huntington argued that the 
fundamental source of conflict would be based on culture. The seven or eight major civilizations 
that would influence the world include: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-
Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African. The kernel of this future inevitable conflict be-
tween Western civilization and Islamic world is hinged on religion because civilizational catego-
ries are mostly defined in terms of, and by, religions. The isolation of Islamic category is instruc-
tive for Huntington because its clash with the Western civilization will be vitriolic. According to 
him, “Islamic civilization will be the most violent civilization and the primary threat to the West 
in the post-Cold War era.”28  
Ali Shariati argued that Marx was bereft of the true nature of religion generally, and Is-
lam in particular. According to him, Marx who was supposed to be “a learned philosopher” 
changed to “a propagatory orator or a sophist politician” because he allowed his private, passion-
ate hatred for religion to be the ground of his philosophical or scientific method. It is true that 
“Marx’s private life and his unsuccessful love caused by Christian priests”29 must have made 
great influence on him. Yet, this should not have led to his generalization of religions. As 
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Shariati observed, Marx would not have heard so much about the basic doctrines of Judaism, nor 
Islam, which clearly teaches “God’s assignation of free will to men, that they might struggle in 
his earthly life and search for his own liberation.”30 Marx made a betrayal of his thesis in his 
recourse to the Promethean faith in Greek mythology, and generalizing it inadequately with the 
Eastern religions. Whereas in Greek religion there is usually a conflict between god and man 
over mundane issues, Eastern religions present God as sympathetic to human plight. Conse-
quently, that Marx said “philosophy is allied with the faith of Prometheus, in short; I hate Gods, 
all reasons denoting God’s existence”31 betrays him. That is why Shariati remarked, 
Therefore, it is not strange while Marx, ‘a scientific philosopher and dialectician’ 
in scientific combat against religion, substitutes the ‘historical and social role of 
religion’ for intellectual and scientific truth of religion’ and tends to prove the fal-
sification of it, which is not an easy task, through condemning it.32  
Hamid N. Rafiabadi added that Marx was not only bereft of the knowledge of religion 
generally but his historical contextualization of Islam was suspect. That Islam originated within 
socio-economic context of Arabia, or that the Arab Caliphate transited from primitive communal 
system to a class society under the “feudal theoretic state” or that “Islam was an ideological re-
flection of these processes” depict that Marx and Lenin were “completely ignorant about Islam, 
hence their criticism it (sic) seems to be merely hypothetical in nature rather than empirical.”33 
Rafiabadi further contended that if Marx and his school of thought had understood Islam and its 
teachings, they would probably have thought differently of religion being an opiate. The argu-
ment that religion engenders subordination to exploiters or submission to fate, abhorrence of 
resistance to evil of any system, aversion to violence, passivity, or endless patience for paradisia-
cal bliss, obstruction to revolutionary struggle against exploitation, etc. are un-Islamic. As he put 
it, 
All this criticism … of religion is not in any way applicable to Islam as Islam does 
not preach subordination to the exploiters. On the contrary, it exalts people to 
safeguard their genuine rights. Islam does not preach passivity rather prepares 
people to be conscious enough to get their rights safeguarded. It permits fight 
against oppressors…. Muslims must have been ordered by Islam to fight on the 
side of the oppressed…. In this way, Islam becomes a revolutionary programme 
for the toiling masses and the oppressed people of the world.34  
Rafaibadi’s argument highlights the limits of Marxism-Leninism. If they thought that re-
ligion opiates or ‘boozes’ the people from revolutionary proclivity or tendency, it would mean 
that they did not consider the possibilities of Islam, which perhaps might have little influence on 
Europe at their time. If this argument is considered pedestrian, the recent global occurrences 
termed ‘new terrorism’, and the Nigerian Boko Haram experience will be good hypotheses. 
Boko Haram Insurgency in Nigeria 
Many views have been canvassed about Boko Haram as a violent sect of Islam in Nige-
ria, especially since its spiral attacks in 2009. In the same vein several suggestions on how best 
to tackle it have inundated the tabloid. While there have been arguable causes and implications 
of its emergence in depth historical and sociological study has not yet been available.35 This may 
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be why the recommendations and the tactics of the security operatives have either not been able 
to arrest the situation or escalate it. 
However, Eskor Toyo’s “Boko Haram and Western Education: A Comment” throws 
some historical insight into the understanding of the phenomenon. Toyo’s work is premised on 
the historical dialectic between capitalism and socialism, which he thinks reflects on the activi-
ties of Boko Haram. According to him, “Boko Haram’s attempt to deride the values of Western 
education is borne out of a genuine ignorance of the enemy – existing capitalist system of exploi-
tation.”36 Thus, beyond the literal meaning of Boko Haram being “Western education is sinful or 
evil,”37 Toyo underscores a political economy of the concept, which may either justify or con-
demn its violence. In this sense Boko will reflect “fakeness, deceit, sham, counterfeiting, make-
belief, falsity or what Nigerians in the street would call ‘wayo’ [deception] or ‘four-one-nine’” 
while Haram will mean “masquerading is rejected.”38  In this reasoning, to insist that Western 
education is the target is “a case of mistaken enemy”39 because the real enemies are those who 
use Western education in an unethical way such as exploitation, oppression, corruption, etc. 
Western education historically functioned to dislodge “religious obscurantism, transcen-
dental and traditional powers” which opposed true human freedom. With the rise of rational phi-
losophy and modern science, and even within Christianity, reason in the service of humanity 
became obvious. This again does not mean that reason has not or cannot be used to pursue spuri-
ous logic to distort facts or tell a lie. But in essence, such distortion would be “a defect of educa-
tion not due to reason itself.”40 From this foregoing, Toyo argued that “if Boko Haram was 
against science, it was simply primitive or mistaken” however, “if Boko Haram attacked Western 
education or culture and identified industrialism as such with that culture in terms of the origin of 
that culture, it was right.”41  
These conclusions, Toyo maintains, are based on the fact that capitalism is a product of 
Western education, which breeds inequality, corruption, oppression, unemployment, etc. Viewed 
from the perspective of Western liberalism, the distorted logic of democracy, which opposed the 
fact of power deriving from the people, as imposed on Africa and Nigeria in particular underlies 
the activities of Boko Haram. What is practiced as democracy in capitalist countries, he argues, 
is plutocracy, the government of the wealthy. In contrary, “democracy was not a gift from the 
kings, dictators and their governments. It was imposed on them by the people.”42 The absence of 
true democracy is therefore a catalyst for violence as Boko Haram is deploying. But again to 
generalize the West as guilty will be a mistaken reasoning. Even though the West is generally 
considered to be capitalist, the examples of North Korea and Cuba, under Fidel Castro and his 
successor with socialist ideology, negates the lack of distinction. While it is true that these ex-
ceptions under capitalist regimes were “a rotten hell for the people” they are at present “the near-
est thing to heaven for the people.”43 This resulted partly from their humane educational policy 
and people-focused economy. With this, Toyo admonishes, “As for Boko, since non-socialist 
civilizations have been predatory and corrupt and need to cover up their antihuman heart with 
human face mask, it is Boko par excellence”44 and as a fake or masquerading bride, it must be 
completely rejected, perhaps through violence. Toyo writes,  
If capitalism nevertheless exists, it is not because the human conscience does not 
reject it; it is simply because material wealth is powerful in many ways. It is only 
when one is prepared for death, as only communists today are prepared for, that 
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one can really have the courage to fight against slave owners and slave users with 
a view to abolishing modern slavery and its abominations.45  
But as lucid as Toyo’s arguments seem, the question he failed to raise and answer is 
whether Boko Haram is a communist or socialist movement. This is important because for what-
ever reasons, he deliberately devoid Boko Haram of being religious or theological. According to 
him, “there is no evidence that Boko Haram itself had theocratic views.”46 If this view is true (of 
course it is not), Toyo will identify Boko Haram with socialist or communist ideology, which 
rejects religion. However, ample and substantiated evidence suggests to the contrary: Boko 
Haram is theocratic; it is not socialism-oriented even though Islam does not prescribe any par-
ticular form of governance. Boko Haram position on this is unambiguous. 
We want to reiterate that we are warriors who are carrying out jihad in Nigeria 
and our struggle is based on the traditions of the Holy Prophet. We will never ac-
cept any system of government apart from the one stipulated by Islam because 
that is the only way that the Muslims can be liberated. We do not believe in any 
system of government, be it traditional or orthodox, except the Islamic system and 
that is why we will keep on fighting against democracy, socialism and whatever. 
We will not allow Nigerian Constitution to replace the laws that have been en-
shrined in the Holy Quran. We will not allow adulterated conventional education 
(Boko) to replace Islamic teachings. We will not respect the Nigerian government 
because it is illegal. We will continue to fight its military and the police because 
they are not protecting Islam. We do not believe in the Nigerian judicial system 
and we will fight anyone who helps the government in perpetrating illegalities.47  
What is implicated is that Islam makes no distinction between the secular and religious. 
Boko Haram’s real name, in Arabic, Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad meaning “As-
sociation of Sunnis for the Propagation of Islam and for Holy War”  or “People Committed to the 
Propagation of the Prophet’s Teaching and Jihad”48 sums up the theocratic leitmotif of what has 
been christened Boko Haram. 
 Like Shehu Sani has shown, Boko Haram under the leadership of late Muhammad Yusuf 
did not hide its puritanical, fundamentalist and theocratic contours. In fact, that the state re-
sponded later than expected implies the insensitivity of the security operatives to threats to na-
tional security. This is because Boko Haram trend followed a similar route like the Maitatsine 
uprising in Kano in 1980. Yusuf envisaged a return to the Medina Order and actually achieved it 
by setting up a parallel state within the Nigerian state on the basis of Sharia. Sani reveals that 
Yusuf “set up laginas (departments), had a cabinet, the Shura, the Hisbah, the brigades of guilds, 
a military wings (sic), a large farm, an effective microfinance scheme, and late Yusuf played the 
role of a judge in settling disputes. Each state had an Amir (leader) including Amirs in Chad and 
Niger that gave account of their stewardship to Yusuf directly.”49 And finally, the fatwa (com-
mand) issued by the sect condemning the constitutional democratic government and all Western 
investitures, and a call to full Islamization of the country tells much of its theocratic agenda. The 
alternative to capitalism – socialism also appears not to be compatible with Islam.50 The cross-
fire between the two competing ideologies has left behind throes of suffering and pain. 
 With the chronicles of the violent activities of Boko Haram since 2009,51 the idea of ji-
had52 which is now not as a concept of “spiritual purification of conscience”53 but a physical de-
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ployment of violence against perceived enemies, call for critical examination. Although those 
concepts have not been given an in depth analysis, what has been paramount in people’s minds is 
how quickly to end the violence the sect is perpetrating. 
 This expectation apparently includes the political economy that undergirds Boko Haram 
activities, granted that the sect as many commentators have suggested, protests against the eco-
nomic injustice of the Nigerian state. Surujudeen Mudasiru,54 Freedom Onuoha55 and Sylvanus 
Okoro56 have argued that poverty is a key factor in Boko Haram activities. Underlying the struc-
tural-functional reason is the argument that violence of this nature is part of the nature of a soci-
ety. It has the propensity of inspiring guiding moral principles for a society. While crime (or vio-
lence) may have its positive side, it becomes dangerous when it turns uncontrollable as evident in 
Boko Haram. This latter situation obviously leads to normlessness, and also requires deliberate 
state action to combat it.57 While it is true that poverty is a prominent cause in security chal-
lenges generally58 the hope of an immediate end to it may be in the balance because, as it stands, 
there appears to be no virile agenda to address this root cause. Not even in the face of fierce, spo-
radic attacks that leave scores of deaths behind them will poverty eradication policy work. But 
this does not lose sight of a religion-inspired violence against a capitalist state contrary to Marx’s 
thesis. In fact, it has added a new dimension to it. 
Boko Haram and ‘New Terrorism’ 
 The year 2001 was a watershed in the history of global terrorism. One of its outcomes is 
the re-conceptualization of terrorism, a term, which on its own is problematic. The attacks on the 
World Trade Center and the Pentagon have redefined existing relations differently prior to this 
time.59 The global and national security problematic has resulted in securitization.60 The concept 
of new terrorism is a by-product of 9/11. It differentiates from the ‘old’ terrorism which is gener-
ally described as anti-capitalist imperialism, anti-national oppression and pro-people power, pro-
socialism, etc. But new terrorism is anti-imperialism or anti-America or Anti-West, “but not anti-
capitalism.”61 While the ‘old’ was secular in nature, the goal of the ‘new’ is the enthronement of 
sharia through jihad of the sword. The ‘new’ is grounded on religious fault line because this is its 
major motivational amphetamine. The point that needs to be made very quickly is that the na-
tionalistic agenda of ‘new’ terrorism as widely represented by radical Islam cuts across the Mus-
lim world, especially those who share this vision. 
It is in the context above that one can explain the jubilation of some Muslims in northern 
Nigeria at the event of 9/11. This implicates what Toyin Falola refers to as “transnationalization, 
denationalization and deterritorialization” of borderless globalization.62 It is also within this 
framework that we can understand the political ideology of Boko Haram as couched in al-Qaeda 
objectives in Africa. According to Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda aims at four things. One, liberat-
ing African Muslims from the apostate state regimes in North and West Africa, especially those 
with close allies with America and Israel. Two, al-Qaeda encouraged jihad against those commit-
ted to the restoration of peace in Sudan and Darfur and Somalia. Three, it refers to such countries 
as Nigeria as being ‘ripe’ for infiltration, not only because of the population of Muslims in the 
north but also as a strategic tool to destabilize the flow of natural resources supplied to its key 
enemies in the West. Four, as an effort to achieve a global borderless Islamic nation, al-Qaeda 
believes that Africa must be adequately mobilized. In order to achieve these aims, it has affili-
ated with Ittihad al Islam in the Horn of Africa as well as the Algerian-based Salafist Group for 
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Preaching and Combat (GSPC) in trans-Saharan areas.63 The conception and deployment of vio-
lence in Nigeria as halal (permissible) must therefore be viewed from this perspective. This is 
important because as it has been widely suggested, dealing with Boko Haram as a hydra-headed 
sect, requires a determined, focused tactics. Two broad suggestions are made in this regard. The 
first has to do with the political aspect while the second focuses on the political economy of the 
problem.  
The first has to do securitization as reflected in new terrorism. Basia Spalek says that 
“‘new terrorism’ has helped to securitise Islam as a religion, where securitisation might be 
thought of as the instigation of emergency politics: a particular social issue that becomes secu-
ritised is responded to above and beyond established rules and frameworks that exist within what 
might be termed ‘normal politics.’”64 In this kind of emergency politics, what is paramount is 
restoring peace by deploying necessary security apparatuses. In order to achieve this there must 
be counter-insurgency measures i.e. “all measures adopted to suppress an insurgency” where 
insurgency means “a struggle to control a contested political space, between a state … and one or 
more popularly based, non-state challengers.”65  It is only when the sect will have been disarmed 
that the state can focus on its grievances from the root.  
 
 The second approach is also complex because of the widespread corruption in the system. 
Corruption has been the bane of development in Nigeria. It also accounts for why reforms are not 
deep-rooted.66 Aside this all important social problem is the suggestion of Almajiri school system 
because it is from this pool of deprived children that Boko Haram has been recruiting its army.67 
But there must be massive investment in formal education to replace the Almajiri schools which 
enrolment is “about seven million children”68 who are given the religious amphetamine. This 
political economy aspect of the problem has always left religion at the hands of its manipulators 
to negotiate their personal agenda, settle their political score or avenge their political failure.69  
 
Conclusion 
 
We have argued that religions must be viewed from their contexts instead of gross gener-
alization as Marx and his school of thought have done. Marx’s generic use of religion is limited 
by Islam. Radical Islam has shown that such broad categorization could be incorrect. The practi-
cal demonstration of this has resulted in the concept of ‘new’ terrorism which is propelled by 
radical Islam. With the democratization and globalization era, religion, particularly Islam has 
vitrified the long held Marxian thesis that religion is an opiate. Global reality shows that religion 
plays integral part in the new world order. This is why the mission statement of the American 
Academy of Religion becomes relevant. It says: “In a world where religion plays so central a 
role in social, political, and economic events, as well as in the lives of the communities and indi-
viduals, there is a critical need for ongoing reflection upon the understanding of religious tradi-
tions, issues, questions, and values.”70  
 
The Nigerian Boko Haram experience shows that religion is not an opiate of the people 
but an amphetamine which excites its members to violence, not only against the generally per-
ceived political issues and political economy realities that have been suggested to underlie its 
activities, but also its spiral attacks on Christians who are equally faced with the same political 
economy challenges. It is the latter that makes Boko Haram issue peculiar, a theocratic regime, 
as it differs from the ‘old’ and ‘new’ forms of terrorism. It is within this context that “emer-
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gency” political strategy is required as a first step to combating the phenomenon. That is why the 
declaration of state of emergency in the affected states in northern Nigeria is a step in the right 
direction. Negotiating with a sect that demands that the whole multi religious entity be converted 
to Islam will not do the country any good. For instance, would the elected governor of Borno 
State resign from office as demanded by the sect, as a prelude to dialogue? The possibility of 
securing a deal with a sect that in principle and action rejects and vitiates the constitution of a 
state is difficult. Intelligence gathering should be a critical aspect of the state of emergency. In 
fact, all the relevant security outfits should be overhauled and reengineered to function in this 
respect. Nigerian government should take serious advantage of listing the sect as an international 
terrorist group. Finally, corruption, poverty and political factors identified as causal to the escala-
tion of the heinous activities of the sect must be deliberately and forthrightly addressed. 
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